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SPEECH OE 

HON. CALEB GUSHING, 

OCTOBER 3, 1S60, 

Befbx'e tlxe Democracy of" 3Xaiiie. 

Gextlemex : I propose, on the present occasion, to discuss principles, consti- 
tutional principles, and especially those of the democratic party. 

That party has directed the administration of the Federal Government for the 
most part during the period of more than half a century. It has aggregated to the 
Un^pn the vast domains of Louisiana, Oregon, Florida, Texas, Xew Mexico and 
California, and in so doing has carried our limits to the Gulf of ]SIexico and the 
Pacific. It has conducted successfully two great foreign wars. It has promoted 
the domestic prosiierity, while maintaining the public honor, and quadrupling the 
national territory. Above all, it has borne the burden of nationality, reconciling 
sectional iiitercsts, at the S'juth uphol-Jing the l-^cal rights of th';- North, r.r.d r.t 
the North upholding the local rights of the South. In fine, it has met bravely, 
and discliarged taithfully, all the onerous and conflicting duties of the govern- 
ment of this great countiy, and has written its history in that country's grandeur 
and glories, at home and abroad, by land and by sea. 

And, at this moment, the democratic party is engaged in a desperate struggle 
with fragments of all the many parties it has heretofore defeated and broken, 
up. At the North, most of these fragments are combined by sectional jealousy, 
and cemented by anti-slaverj^ fanaticism, into a sectional Northern party by the 
name of Republicans, speakmg and acting as if intended not so much to adminis- 
ter the government of the Union, as to invade and attempt to conquer the South- 
ern States. At the South, these fi-agments are combined rather by reminiscen- 
ces of local antagonism to the democratic party than anything else ; for there is 
nothing to distinguish the Union party fi-om us, either at the South or the North, 
as regards our common opposition to the Republicans, or in our common attach- 
ment to the Constitution and the Union. 

We, meanwhile, of the democratic party, are alienated from one another by 
supposed discrepancies of opinion, and severed into supporters of ^Ir. Breckin- 
ridge and supporters of Mr. Douglas, so as by our own controversies, rather than 
by the strength of our adversaries, to imperil the integrity of the Constitution 
and the safety of the Union. 

I think it is high time, then, that we of the democratic party, and of both di- 
visions of it, should stop to take an observation, and to look around and see where 
we are and whither we drift, — that we calmly consider the questions of principles, 
if any which divide us, and their relation to ourselves and to the general welfare 
of the Union. That is what I propose to do, — to iliscuss principles, not persons. 

I have temptation enough, to be sure, as President of the National Convention, 
and as one of the supporters of 3Ir. Breckinridge, to discuss persons, and to repel 
the personal assaults on myself made in this canvass, not by Mr. Douglas, but 
by unwise partisans of his. I refrain however. I speak as one of the friends of 
Mr. Breckinridge, but not as tlie eneni'- of Mr. Douglas, having knowle'lge of 
things as to the latter, which lead me to blame others, more than himself, for his 
irregular and forced candidature, and which impel me, not indeed to justify or 
extenuate, but to note unresentfully, the erratic counsel, and the desperateness of 
spirit, Avhich characterize his recent public discourses. 

I mean to speak in good faith, and I desire to be heard with candor. I do not 
condemn those avIio differ from me. I do but regret and deplore the differences, 
conceding, but claiming also, the right of private judgment. How, otherwise, — 
how but in dispassionately reasonmg together sometimes, can popular, represen- 
tative, republican government be maintained ? Not otherwise, certainly, in these 
United States. 

The great political issue of the day is undoubtedly the slavery question. Shall 
the Constitution be overthrown and the Union dissolved, as the Abolitionists 
proper contend, for the purpose of abolisliing slave-labor in the Southern States, 
or at any rate of separating us of ^the Northern States from the Southern, where 
it exisits ? That is attack on slavery outside of the Constitution. Or shall the 
functions of the Federal Government be perverted and abused, and the Constitu- 
tion be maintained nominally, but violated in fact, for the purpose ol' attacking 



slaverj^ inside of the Constitution ? That is, in my judgment, the real, though 
pcrliaps unconscious, policy and the ultimate aim of the Republicans. But tlie 
Republicans are well aware that the Constitution is stronger in the attachment of 
the people even of the North, than they and their opinions. Hence their policy 
of making fight on the secondary accidents of slavery. That enables tlieni to 
declaim against and denounce slavery, and thus to have the anti-slavery emotions 
of tlie North to fill their sails, and waft them along, vrhilst all of them pretend- 
ing, and many of them intending, not to inti'inge the Constitution or endanger 
the Union. And the accident or incident of slavery, on which the Chicago Re- 
publican Convention proposes to act now, is the question of slavery in the Terri- 
tories. Thus, quite secondary as this question is in the estimation of the Abo- 
litionists proper, and as it is in truth, still, as the Republicans make the attack at 
that point, there they have to be met by the defenders of the Constitution. And 
in this way it is, that so comparatively trivial and practically unimportant a ques- 
tion as the possible existence of slavery in one or more of the Territories, becogies 
the question of the clay- throughout the United States. 

To understand this question thoroughly, and to prepare to rid our minds of all 
the current fallacies and sophisti'ies regarding it, we must consider for a moment 
the nature of the Territories, and then- relation to the Federal Government. 

The United States have, we know, almost from the beginning, possessed an 
immense domain of unsettled or unappropriated lands, which, as in the progress 
of the expansion of our population it became settled, has been gradually divided 
into what were originally demominated " Districts," and more recently " Terri- 
tories," and then formed into New States. This domain has consisted, first, of 
territory, or claims of territory, ceded to the Federal Government by the origi- 
nal States ; secondly, of territory since acquired by the Federal Government 
through successive cessions from foreign powers. The number of Districts or Ter- 
ritories thus organized from time to time, beginning with the celebrated ordinance 
" for the government of the territory of the United States northwest of the river 
Ohio," anterior to the Constitution, and ending with the recent act to organize 
the Territories of Nebraska and Kansas, is not less, I think, than fifteen or six- 
teen ; and these organic acts, with numerous general and special acts in past mat- 
eria, constitute a voluminous body of what may be termed the colonization laws 
of the United States. They are the text, by the inspection of which, and their 
collation with the Constitution of the United States, we are to ascertain the trutli, 
as to the particular matters in conti'oversy between the Republicans and Dem- 
ocrats in the first instance, and then betwixt the Democrats themselves. 

The general object of all these acts is one and the same every where, indub- 
itably. It is to provide, for the settlers of each District or Territory, legality of 
local admimstration during the transient period of time intervening between its 
settlement and its constitutional organization as a State, which organization is its 
transition from the condition of pupilage as a Territory to that of sovereignty as 
a State. 

We, in the United States, build up all government on the fundamental idea of 
the sovereignty of the people, that is, of the entire mass of the qualified mem- 
bers of the particular body politic. But their numerousness renders it impossible 
for the people to govern in person, except to a certain degree in small commun- 
ities, like the town governments of New England, and even these have to act 
through representative organizations of elected or appointed official persons, -with 
functions limited and defined by law, which law is, directly or indirectlj', the 
expression of the will of the sovereign people. Hence, laws, constitu- 
tional, organic, or municipal, to organize the machinery of govermnent. The 
object of all these laws is to avoid leaving things to the mere discretion of pubhc 
agents, and to prevent such agents from assuming to do as they please under pre- 
tence of tlic name of the people. Ik-nee, also, in the political theory of the United 
States, the universal and axiomatic trutli, that all acts, of whatever persons, pre- 
tending to have legal authority, must be traceable to a constitutional source, either 
of the United States, or one of the States. All pretence of authority, outside 
of some such legal source of derivation, whether ascribed to the mystic name of 
popidar sovereignty, or the assumed right of self government, is mere usurpation 
if done by persons under color of office, and, if done by persons without color of 
office, is mob violence or force. 

For instance, the Legislature of IVIaiiie cannot pass any laws under pretence of 
popular sovereignty : it must find authority for the law in the Constitution of 
the State. 

Again, the City Councils of Bangor cannot i)ass ordinances under jiretence of 



GfFT 

WRGARET W. c.SH ^ 
JAN. 26, isvg 



K\ 



? • ^ '^ 

^ 3 

t)opular sovereignty : they must find authority for the ordinance in the organic 
act of the Legislature constituting the City. 

If the City Councils of Bangor or the Legislature of Maine should undertake 
to deprive either of you, gentlemen, of any right of person or property, you 
Avould laugh to scorn the suggestion that they did this in virtue of popular sov- 
ereignty : you would demand to see the clause in the organic act of the City or 
in that of the constitution of the State, in virtue of which the act was done. 

So as to the question of self-government. Self-government is an attribute of 
sovereignty. It signifies political independence and authority. It imports the 
government of others as well as of one's self When you tallc of self-govern- 
ment in a Territory, you intend that certain persons therein are to malie laws to 
control, not themselves only, but you or me if we happen to be there. But if 
they undertake to govern me, to aftect my right of person or property, they must 
produce legal authority for what they do, and that legal authority derived from 
organic law or constitution. It avails nothing for tliose persons to talk to me 
about popular sovereignty, self-government, and the rights of man : my rights of 
man and of self-government, and my popular sovereignty, are as good as theirs ; 
1 set mine up against theirs ; if such clap-trap phrases are to help them to attack 
my person or property, the same phrases must equally serve me to defend my 
person and property. But the whole thing is absurd. The people of a Territory 
govern themselves, and others in it also, by laws duly enacted in conformity with ■ 
the organic act and the Constitution, and no otherwise. 

But shall not the people rule ? This is a cry, which has a plausible sound and 
seeming in the case, and that is all. I reply, — yes, the people shall rule. But 
they must rule rightfully and lawfully, not wrongfully and unlawfully ; and they 
must be the people in fact, not in pretension merely. Any persons, few or many, 
who undertake to rule, that is to rule you and me, to constitute a government, 
must show their commission. Such persons are not to imprison us, or take away 
our property, iinder pretense of being " the people." To make the question 
practical, — In the City of Bangor, shall not the people rule "? Yes, as the City of 
Bangor, and within the limits of the organic law of the City, and the constitu- 
tions and laws of the State of Maine and the United States. Thus and thus 
only shall the City of Bangor rule. If it undertakes to be the State of Maine, or 
the United States of America, as such it shall not rule. And if, under pretence 
that the people are to rule, the City Councils of Bangor assume to do things, 
which it belongs only to tlie Legislature or to Congress to do, any of us, who are 
aggrieved thereby, will appeal for protection and redress from the people of Ban- 
gor to the people of the State or the people of the United States. And so, if per- 
sons in a Territory, more or less in number, assume injuriously to do things 
which it belongs only to a State or the United States to do, and what they thus 
presume to do alFects our rights, we shall not be frightened or humbugged, by 
their pretence of being ' people,' into the surrender of our rights ; but sliall ap- 
peal from them to the true people, the people of the United States, and demand 
and obtain protection at the hands of the constituted judicial, legislative and exec- 
utive authorities of the people of the United States. 

Can the people rule any where, — can popular government exist in any country ? 
Thank God, it can, it does, in our country. But the people rule, here, only by 
respecting itself, and its own name and power. Who are the ' people V Is it 
any one man who so pretends ? Is it any hundred men ? Is it a group of men 
at the street corners '? Is it the persons assemliled in this hall ? No, — all these 
are ' people,' but they are not ' the people.' The people of any political society 
are the entire of the qualified members, acting in their lawful capacity as such, 
and doing the things which they are constitutionally empowered to do as such. 
Outside of, and beyond that, is revolution or usurpation. Concede that any 
body of persons, large or small, anywhere in the United States, shall assume to 
be ' the people' and as such to exercise power without constitutional authority, 
and popular government is at an end with us. For a few days or weeks, it will 
be the government of Plug Uglies, Short Boj^s and Killers, and, after that, of the 
Soldier who shall happen to be the busiest in killing them. I think it is not 
worth while to sacrifice or prejudice the rights of the whole people of the United 
States, and our own individual rights, in order to enable a small bit of the people 
to ' talk big' and ' make a swell' in one of the Territories. 

I hear occasionally some foolish spread-eagle declamation in this regard, which 
assumes that, as the Thirteen Colonies asserted and successfully maintained their 
ndependence of Great Britain, therefore the Territories are or should be invested 



with self-government. That means, if it means anything, that the Territories shall 
set up for themselves as independent sovereignties outside of the Union. It means, 
if it means anything, that they shall rebel against the United States It was to a 
stamp tax and a tea tax imposed by Great IJritain, and not to a stamp tax or a tea 
tax imposed by the United States, that the people of North Carolina and Massa- 
chusetts Bay objected. It is quite ridiculous to apply this set of ideas to any ques- 
tion of constitutionality and legality within the Union Suppose again, as we did 
on the question of popular sovereignty, that the City Councils of Bangor should 
assume to confiscate your farm Would you consider \ ourself satisfied by the sug- 
gestion that they were doing this in the exercise of the right of self-government, 
by virtue of theprinciples of the Declaration of Independence, and of the national 
contest between the Thirteen Colonies and Great Britain? 

Take one other illustration of the subject The old-fashioned town governments 
of New England are the nearest approach to actual self-government and to the ex- 
ercise of the functions of sovereignty by the people. We in New England ought to 
have sufficient experience of them at least to understand their political theory and- 
principles. Did any body in a town meeting ever imagine that the town meeting 
could do other than but as it was authorized to do by the laws of the State ? Did 
any town ever get such a silly idea into its head as to think of confiscating private 
property in virtue of the theory of self-government, and the principles of popular 
sovereignty and the Declaration of Independence ■? It would be just as reasonable 
for the Town of Hampden to talk in this way as for the Territory of Kansas to do 
it, or for any body else to talk so in behalf of the Territory of Kansas. 

The fallacies, on which I have been commenting, are so gross, so utterly des- 
titute of all sense and reason, — and the truths on the other side so elementary, — 
that I am half ashamed to speak of them to grown men, and especially Americans 
living in the light of books and newspapers, and universally practiced in the busi- 
ness of republican government. It is really going back to A, b, Ab, — and to the 
multiplication table. And yet, amazing to say, it has become absolutely necessary 
to come to this, even in New England, in order to rid ourselves of the extraordina- 
ry current political fallacies and absurdities regarding the government of the ter- 
ritories. 

I repeat, then, the assertion of universal truth, that in the political theory of the 
United States, all acts, of whatsoever persons pretending to have legal authority of 
whatsoever nature and wherever performed, must be traceable to a constitutional 
source, either of the United States or of one of the States. Hence the necessity, in 
the Territories, of some act or ordinance of Congress, to institut ; government— I 
say, the necessity of some ordinance or act of Congress ; for persons and things in 
one of these Territories are not the subjects of any foreign government, like the 
Canadas ; they are not independent powers, like Mexico : they are not citizens of 
or within the jurisdiction of any one of the States ; and therefore, whilst in the ter- 
ritorial condition, they remain, of constitutional necessity, subject to the paramount 
jurisdiction of the Federal Government, — the nature and extent of that jurisdiction, 
and its limitations, being defined by the Constitution of the United States. 

But it will be asked, may not the Territories be self governing organized political 
societies ? I reply. Yes and No. They may be self-governing in the same way 
that the City of Bangor is, — to wit, entrusted by the organic law with so much of 
local government as it may seem to the State convenient or expedient to grant, and 
no more, so as that the City Councils shall not be able to derogate from the general 
rights of any of the citizens of the State, or of the State itself, or of the United 
States So much of self-government, and no more, have the Territories. Political 
sovereignty, which is the essence ot political self-government, they do not possess, 
any more than the City of Bangor possesses it. 

As governments they are but emanations of the Federal Government, precisely in 
the same way that the City of Bangors government emanates from the State of 
Maine. In that sense Congress enacts an organic law, which is the temporary or 
territorial constitution of the future State. These organic laws, like the constitu- 
tions of States, provide the framework of local government, define the powers of 
public officers, executive, legislative and judicial, and the manner of their appoint- 
ment or election, and prescribe what things may be done, and what not, by the local 
authorities of the District or Territory. 

This framework of territorial government is according to the universal type of 
political organization in this country, namely, an executive chief, sometimes elective 
and sometimes not ; a select deliberative body called senate or legislative council, 
with mixed functions, executive, legislative or judicial, the members of which are 
sometimes elective and sometimes not ; a more numerous deliberative body, having 
legislative functions only, always elective, and so purporting to be the popular rep- 



resentation ; and administrative and judicial officers, variously appointed, and with 
various duty and authority defined by some law, constitutional, organic or munici- 
pal, as the case may be. Such is the type or framswork of the Federal Government, 
that of each of the States, that of all our great Cities ; and such is thit of all the 
Territories. 

Each Territory is permitted to have a delegate to t'le House of Representatives, 
to speak, but not to vote ; but the Territories have no Senators ; and its inhabitants 
do not participate in the election of President of the United States. 

The political charges of the Territory in every case, and many of the municipal 
ones, are defrayed by the United States. 

Such is the general system of our territorial governments. Minor diversities ex- 
ist, nevertheless, some of substance and others of form, which require explanation. 
For instance, as to the matter of form,-according to all the early organic acts, members 
of the Legislative Councils were appointed by and responsible to the Federal Gov- 
ernment, as the Governors still are in every case. But the most notable variations 
are in some matters of the substance of internal organization or local administration. 
It suffices here to consider one of these, namely, some organic territorial provisions 
of acts of Congress, which propose to determine beforehand, and for all time, mat- 
ters of municipal or internal right, which by the Constitution of the United States 
appeitain to the immediate jurisdiction, not of the Federal Government, but of the 
separate States. 

The Congress of the Confederation inserted in the ordinance for the government 
of the territory of the United States northwest of the river Ohio, certain organic 
provisions, to be considei'ed as ' articles of compact between the original States and 
the people and States in the said territory.' All these provisions, though called 
principles of liberty, are in fact perpetual restrictions on the legislative and consti- 
tutional power of the future new State. For instance, they forbid forever all relig- 
ious regulations ; they require judicial proceedings to be according to the course of 
the common law ; and they prohibit involuntary servitude except in the punishment 
of crimes. 

It is due to historic truth to say, and, in order that the North and South may 
each take its proper share of the responsibility for present difficulties, it is expedi- 
ent now to say, that Mr. Jefferson was the author of this anti-slavery provision, or 
rather of the idea of such a provision ; for, although not at the time a member of 
Congress, he was so three years before, and at that time introduced and endeavored 
to carry the proposition. 

At length, soon afterwards, the government of the United States, under which that 
ordinance was passed, gave place to the government of the United States as now 
constituted. It is still a Confederation or Federal Union. It is more complex and 
complete in its organization than its predecessor ; and it differs radically from that 
in having entrusted to it a limited jurisdiction for certain defined objects, over the 
individual citizens of States. Still, like its predecessor, it possesses such powers 
only as the thirteen sovereign states saw fit to entrust to it ; and in providing for 
the admission of new States, it provides that they shall come into the Union coe- 
qual in all respects of political right and power with the original States. It says 
nothing of Territories as political bodies ; but employs the word " territory " in the 
same sense as the great ordinance does, that is. only as a geographical or proprie- 
tary designation ; and gives no hint of course of Territories with sovereign or quasi- 
sovereign power in the nature of the States. So stands the Constitution. 

Question as to the relation of the Constitution to the peculiar organic provisions 
of the ordinance does not seem to have arisen immediately. We may infer this 
from the tenor of a very early act of Congress enacted, as the preamble sets forth, 
in order that the ordinance may ' continue to have full effect.' We may infer it 
fitill more from the fact that when, eigiit or ten years afterwards, a territorial gov- 
ernment, that of Mississippi, was first established to the southwest of the river 
Ohio, on the territory of the cession of the State of Georgia, the provisions of the 
onjinance were all made applicable to that territory, with exception only of the 
article as to involuntary servitude. And so Congress continued, for a long period, 
on each successive organization of a territorial government, to refer to this ordin- 
ance, even in a case of so mnch incongruousness, in various respects, as that of the 
Territary. of Orleans. Nay, so far from duly considering the question of the 
constituiionality of the ordinance in these respects. Congress proceeded on the thir- 
tieth yesw of the present Constitution to enact a slavery provision of the same tenor 
for the northern part of the original territory of Louisiana ; and did the same thing 
twenty fiv« and more years later, in the act for the a(hni.ssion of the State of Texas 
and that of the orgajiwation of the 'I'erritorv of Oregon. 



Meanwhile, during the same period of upwards of fifty years, many acts of Con- 
gress had been passed, even compacts between the United States and one after 
another cf the new States, which materially impaired the municipal sovereignty of 
those States in matters of eminent domain and soil. These acts at length drew 
attention to the unconstitutionality of all provisions of ordinance or act of Congress 
imposing restriction on the constitutive capacity of new States, or on their legisla- 
tive capacity, in any particular in which the old States are not equally restricted by 
the Constitution. 

Their unconstitutionality is now the established rule of public law ; not estab- 
lished, as so many of the republican orators and writers continue to imagine, by 
the case of Scott vs. Sanford, but by a series of adjudications long anterior to that, 
and which cannot now be reversed without unsettling land titles and everything 
else in all the new States. 

And, in accordance with this doctrine it is, that all provisions, for the permanent 
regulation of the municipal or domestic concerns of new States, have at last come 
to be excluded from organic acts of Congress. 

But some one may say, — Concede for the argument's sake that Congress cannot 
determine for any State in advance whether it shall or shall not have serf-labor ; — 
May it not, however, exclude this from the Territory while in its territorial condi- 
tion ? I reply, No ; first, because the Constitution gives it no power to that effect, 
and secondly, because to do this would be to preclude the citizens of the Southern 
States from colonizing with their property, and living in, the common territory of 
all the States ; and it would be to appropriate that to the exclusive colonization and 
use of the Northern States. 

The citizens of the Southern States, entering the Territory of right with their 
property, are subject to have it taken away from them by the constitution, which 
the citizens of the Territory may in due time establish, to have effect as such on 
its becoming a State. In right of its sovereignty and eminent domain a sovereign 
state may do unjust things. Thus, but for the prohibitory provisions of the Con- 
stitution of the United States, any State might make laws impairing the obligations 
of contracts. So, but for that prohibition, it might pass ex-post facto \avfs. So, 
again, the Constitution of the United States not prohibiting it, a State may divest 
vested rights. So, also a State may confiscate property, or take it for public use 
without just compensation, because in this respect the Constitution of the United 
States contains no limitation of the organic power of the several States. 

In going to settle in one of the new Territories, therefore, the citizen takes the 
risk of what it may do in this respect as a State, just as he dwells in any State sub- 
ject to the same contingency. But the territorial Legislature has no lawful au- 
thority to that end. While in the territorial condition the organic act is in effect 
the constitution of the Territory. The Legislative Assembly is the temporary trust- 
ee of the Federal Government, just as the Governor or Surveyor General, or any 
other officer is, to do the things authorized and permitted by the organic and other 
acts of Congress. In establishing territorial governments, we do not create an irre- 
sponsible despotism, and let it loose on the world to plunder and oppress at dis- 
cretion ; on the contrary we constitute a mere agent to execute powers which 
the principal confers. Thus, by the act organizing the Territories of Nebraska 
and Kansas, it is provided that The legislative power of the Territory shall extend 
to all ny<</M/ subjects of legislation consistent with the Constitution of th-j United 
States and the provisions of this act,' — and let me add, of other pertinent acts of 
Congress. But there is nothing in this act or any otlier, which imparts to terri- 
torial legislature, power to destroy private property either directly or indirectly by 
unfriendly legislation. And, if any such power had been granted in express words, 
the grant would have been inoperative and void ; for the Federal Government pos- 
sesses no such power, and therefore cannot convey any such power to others ; but, 
on the contrary, the taking of private property by the Federal Government for public 
purposes without just compensation, that is, its arbitary expropriation, being in 
positive terms inhibited by the Constitution. 

1 have thus argued and expounded the nature of territorial government, as it seems 
to me to be, on comparison of all the organic territorial laws and of the Constitution. 
But this review would be imperfect without more definite reference to adjudications, 
in wiiich the law of the subject has been determined, so far as anything can be 
judically determined, by the courts of the United States. 

The Supreme Court, by Ciiief Justice Marshall, in the case of the American In- 
surance Company vs. Canter, declares in substance that the power of the Federal 
Government to govern tiie Territories, subject to the limitations of the (Constitution, 



is unquestionable, and that the territory acquires the power with the means of self- 
government, only by becoming a State. 

In the case of Luther vs. Borden, the Supreme Court ruled that in the United 
Staes, all lawful authority must have a lawful point of departure, and that all leg- 
islation or constitution outside of legal channels ©faction and authority, is insurrec- 
tiont revolution and usurpation. 

In, the case of Pollard vs. Hagan, the Supreme Court have decided that none of 
the new States can be subjected to any limitations or restrictions of their constitu- 
tive and legislative powers, except such as the Constitution had imposed on the 
old States. They repeat this decision in two other cases where the same point was 
carried up for reconsideration. 

In the case of Permoli vs. New Orleans, the Supreme Court decided that the 
religious freedom article of the ordinance was a nullity, because it restricted the 
power of the new States in a matter in which the old States were unrestricted. 

In the case of Strader vs. Graham, the Supreme Court decided that for the same 
reason the anti-slavery article of the ordinance was a nullity. 

And it was but in the neccessary sequence of this line of decision, that, in the 
case of Scott vs. Sanford, the Supreme Court decided that neither directly, nor in- 
directly through its creature the territorial Legislature, could the Federal Govern- 
ment intervene to exclude citizens of the Southern States from right of settlement 
in a Territory with their property, coequal with the rights of citizens of Northern 
States. 

All the angry fault-finding with the Supreme Court, therefore, on account of the 
decision in the case of Scott vs. Sanford, and all cavil on the point whether that case 
is decision or opinion only, are the result of ignorance, quite as much as passion 
and prejudice ; for the same points of territorial law were in fact comprehended by 
the principles of the case of Pollard vs. Hagan and the others of that series and \ 
class of questions. ) 

Pause we now here, gentlemen, to see how the principles of public law thus ex- 
pounded affect the action of political parties, at the present time. 

In the first place, the Republicans still cling to the exploded doctrine of the 
right of and the duty of Congress to legislate, directly and indirectly for the ex- 
clusion of slave labor from the Territories, and its prospective prohibition in new 
States. 

The Democrats, on the other hand, are unanimous, friends of Mr. Breckinridge 
and friends of Mr. Douglas alike, in denying to Congress either the power or the 
duty to do this. Accordingly, by one of the resolutions adopted by the Cincinnati 
Convention, we have introduced into the political creed of the party the doctrine of 
' non-interference by Congress with slavery in State and Territory or in the Dis- 
trict of Columbia.' 

But what is the meaning of this proposition ? Does it mean that although Con- 
gress (that is,|the Federal Government), shall not interfere directly, yet it may 
and shall indirectly, by the hand of its creature and agent, the territorial Legisla- 
ture ? Does it mean to say that if an agent of the Federal Government should 
interfere, still it cannot and shall not stop him 1 Certainly the Convention could 
not have intended thus to trifle with the question. And it did not. For by another 
resolution it declared how and when the Territory might act, afiSrmatively or neg- 
atively, on the subject of slavery, that is, when it should come 'to form a consti- 
tution' so as to I)e admitted to the Union ' upon terms of perfect equality with the 
other States.' 

The Southern States, with absolute unanimity, admit the power of the new 
State to establish or abolish slavery by its constitution ; they maintain, with all but 
absolute unanimity, that thus and then, and then and thus only, can the Territory 
act as a sovereign people ; they, with all but absolute unanimity, deny this power 
to the territorial Legislature ; and, if not with perfect unanimity, yet with decisive 
preponderance of voice, they contend that, if a territorial Legislature, which is 
the creature of the Federal Government, assumes to usurp authority in this mat- 
ter, then it is the duty of Congress to interpose to counteract such usurpation, and 
so protect rights unconstitutionally attacked by such Legislature. 

I say, upon this last point, if not unanimity, there is preponderance of opin- 
ion. The dissent of the minority is induced by a fallacy so patent, that its belief 
by some persons of reputation for intelligence astonishes me. They think that, if 
Congress may act to protect riglits in a Territory, it may act to destroy them ; 
that action either way is jurisdiction ; and that jurisdiction must be complete juris- 
diction. I repeat, the utterance of such fallacy as this by intelligent persons 
amazes me. Is it notaparent, that most of the institutions of society are for the 



purpose of protecting rights, not of destroying them ! Thus, for example, \h& 
dutj' and power imposed on the Federal Government to protect the country in 
case of foreign invasion or domestic insurrection, and its jurisdiction to that etfect, 
do by no manner of means confer the right and power of invasion or insurrection. 
Strange that such errors should find lodgment in the mind of any man. North or 
South. Non-interference in the affairs of Europe is the accepted policy of the 
United States : Does this signify that, if any agent of the United States, or any 
foreign power there, undertakes to violate American rights of person or property, 
the Federal Government can do nothing for the pl-otection of those rights 1 How 
is it possible there should be conflict of opinion on such a question 1 

And if it were otherwise, if it could be imagined that a constitutional grant of 
power to protect involves the power to destroy, should we gain anything by assent- 
ing to the alternative hypothesis, and committing plenary power ot destruction to 
a handful of irresponsible persons in a Territory 1 What Congress does, it does 
responsibly ; every citizen participates in its deliberations and has influence over 
its acts through the Senators and the Representatives of his State; But this vol- 
unteer ' sovereign' in the Territory is amenable to nobody, — unless it be to some 
Emigrant Aid Company and its manager, Mr. Eli Thayer Of course, the idea 
suits him exactly ; and he is now its official advocate in the State of Massachusetts. 
I prefer the jurisdiction of the Federal Government to the jurisdiction of the 
Emigrant Aid Company. 

Gentlemen, to this point, then, we have arrived : On the one side stand reason,, 
history, judicial decision, fact, and truth ; on the other side, two idols, two idols of 
gilt brass, called ' non-intervention' and ' popular sovereignty,' which are set up on. 
high, and which all men are called upon to fall down to and worship, but which it. 
needs only to rub to show their worthlessness. 

It is pretended that the United States, which has power to protect federal rights- 
within either of the States, or even in Europe or farthest Asia, has no power tO' 
protect such rights in one of our own Territories. And to give effect to this mon- 
strous doctrine, the territorial Legislature has attributed to it inherent and origi- 
nal sovereign power superior to all the rights of the t^tates and their people. 

It is impossible for human error to go further than this. And these mistakes of 
some are now the misfortune of all. For the doctrine will not bear examination ; 
neither Mr Douglas nor anybody else has ever sustained it by intelligible or even 
plausible reasoning ; it is contrary to all theory of constitutional government; and 
it specially conflicts with settled public law in the institutions of the United States. 
Of course, we cannot assent to the doctrine, nor follow its lead. Neither self-re- 
spect, nor conscientious conviction, nor permanent party interests, nor considera- 
tions of the public weal, permit us to do so. And thus the democratic party is 
distracted, and split in twain, at a time when it most needs unitedness in order to 
overcome, as, if united, it might, the pernicious plans and purposes of the Repub- 
licans. 

I speak on this occasion in sorrow, not in anger. I impugn no man's motives ; 
I vituperate no man ; I do not even stop to hurl back the missiles of calumny so 
profusely flung at myself; I do but lament the antagonisms of opinion, which 
rend us asunder, and, in doing so, threaten to rend assunder the Union itself 

What resource have we 1 Hope, earnest hope, that the three great central States 
of New York, Pennsylvania aod Virginia, will stand firm, and so save the dem- 
ocratic party and save the Union. 

If not, then we have but the future to look to ; and among the grave considera- 
tions, which that involves, is the future of the democratic party. As to that, in one 
respect at least, there is no doubt, or shadow of doubt, resting on my mind. 

I pretend that the conclusions of constitutional law, which are the avowed pro- 
fession of faith of that sub-division of the National Convention, which sat in the 
hall of the Maryland Institute, must and will prevail as the only possible creed of 
the national democratic party in these United States. I found that pretention on 
the following reasons of belief or of fact : 

These conclusions are the truth of the matter; and truth is mighty ; and in spite 
of all present obstacles, it must and will ultimately prevail ; however obucured by 
personal interests or party passifjns for awhile, it cannot fail to shine out at length 
in purity untarnished and in lustrous splendor. 

These conclusions are in conformity with the opinion of the Supreme Court of 
the United States in the case of Scott vs. Sanford ; that opinion, according to the 
belief of a great majority of the democratic party. North and South, is decision ; and 
it avails nothing for the minority to cavil upon the question whether it be decision 
or opinion merely; if it be the latter onlv. still it has overpowering moral au- 
thority as deliberate and reasoned opinion of the highest judicial tribunal of the Union 



9 

The Convention at the Maryland Institute was a fall and true representation of 
the democratic party in the Southern States and so considerable a representation 
of democrats in tlie North, that, without their co-operation, the Democrats cannot 
carry a single one of the Northern States. 

The doctrines of that Convention are in accordance with resolutions adopted by 
the present tfenate of the United States with but two dissentient democratic votes, 
and \^hich, it is well known, have the approbation of a similar proportion of the 
democratic members of the present House of Representatives. 

These doctrines have been afBrmed again and again by democratic State Con- 
ventions and by State Legislatures in the Southern States, and have not been con- 
tradicted, denied or doubted by any authoritative and responsible democratic body 
there ; and of course any democratic organizations in the Northern States, which 
do not affirm the same doctrines, may continue to be Democrats, but they cease to 
be national, and become sectional Democrats. 

The doctrines of the Institute Convention are the doctrines of Mr. Buchanan 
and his Cabinet. It is idle to underestimate the importance of this fact. To be 
sure, it has been frequent enough, even among Democrats, harshly to criticise some 
of the acts of President Buchanan's Administration. We have had too much of 
that. It is the common fate of all Administrations to be the butt of the discon- 
tents of friends, and of the devices of aspirants, as well as of the relentless war- 
fare of opponents and enemies. I know full well by experience how much of in- 
justice there is in all these forms and diversities of the opposition of the ill-wishers 
of an Administration. It is the ammunition of every presidential campaign. And 
when that campaign is over, and history comes to perform her task of retrospect 
and review, we have seen how little there is of substance in the aspersions heaped, 
year after year, on each successive President of the United States In that light, 
history already regards Franklin Pierce ; and so it will regard James Buchanan. 
And be it remembered that every President of the United States is always, and of 
necessity, the political head for the time being of the party which elevates him to 
power. In elevating him to official authority it elevates him to political authority. 
It is the acts of the Administration, and not the speeches of Congress, which give 
direction and body to the national policy. It is things, not words, by which men 
are mastered : words are but the noise which attends on the things. Hence, it is 
safe to calculate that whither an Administration goes, thither the party which it 
represents goes, at least in the United States. 

Adverting to the present differences on this point in the democratic party at the 
South, it is to be observed that no Southern Democrat of any authority, whether he 
be for Mr. Breckinridge or for Mr. Douglas, accepts the views of Mr. Douglas on 
the power of territorial Legislatures, while the conspicuous partisans of Mr. Doug- 
las at the South expressly repudiate those views ; and that although some of his 
triends at the South profes's to understand the doctrine of non-intervention just as 
he does, yet, when they come to explain themselves, it appears that they do not so 
understand it ; for it yet remains for me to encounter a single Southern statesman, 
who assumes, as Mr. Douglas does, that for Congress to ir.tervene through its 
creature, the territorial Legislature, is non-intervention, or that territorial Legis- 
latures possess inherent powers to do things not authorized hj the act of Congress 
organizing the Territory. Of course, that orthodox view of the subject, which is 
all but universal now, must eventually become absolutely universal among South- 
ern Democrats. 

Adverting to the same differences at the North, it is to be observed that the fal- 
lacies on the subject,which Mr. Douglas has propagated, being fallacies, must pass 
away lor that reason ; and for the more superficial reason, ttiat a fraction of the 
democratic party at the North, whether it be a large fraction or a small one, cannot 
maintain itself upon a mere legal fallacy against another fraction of the same party 
at the North standing on truth and in full communion with the whole democratic 
party of the South; and that in the attempt so to maintain itself, it becomes at once 
a sectional third party, and a mere sectional faction, in certain of the Northern States. 

I pretend further that the conclusions of constitutional law, which I have endeav- 
ored to expound and defend to-day, are not only thesole possible creed of a national 
democratic party, but the sole possible creed of any national constitutional Union 
party in the United States. 

To arrive at this conclusion, we have but to look at the position of that party, 
numerous at the South, though less so at the North, which iir^es the presidential 
candidature of Mr. Bell. This party, to be sure, docs not profess any special creed, 
and contents itself with proclaiming its loyality to the Con-titution and the Union. 
But we cannot greatly err, ifwe infer the creed of tliis party, or at any rate if we 



10 

argue of the policy this party proposes to itself in case it should attain power, 
from the well ascertained opinions of Mr. Bell himself. I find these opinions set, 
forth in a document published officially by the 'iSJational Executive Committee of 
the Constitutional Union Party," and which is denominated ' Mr. Bell's Record.' 
It consists mainly of extracts from his public speeches and political correspondence. 

Mr Bell, in these extracts, repeatedly and most explicitly and emphatically dis- 
putes, denies, and repudiates the territorial sovereignty doctrines of Mr. Douglas. 
It is unnecessary to cite passages to the pomt. On this, Mr. Bell is quite as positive 
as any Northern or Southern democrat. 

And how stands Mr. Bell as to the other and more critical question, that of pro- 
tection to slave-property in the Territories ? This question really includes or at 
least overrides the other one. It is to escape from the claim of the South to such pro- 
tection that Mr. Douglas and his Northern advocates would ascribe sovereign pow- 
er to territorial Legislatures. It is that claim of protection, which so many North- 
ern Democrats are unwilling to admit into the creed of the democratic party, 
because of its assumed unpopularity at the North. And, to my great surprise, 
some of the most intelligent of the Northern advocates of Mr. Bell, suppose that 
this protection claim ot Southern Democrats is to prevent the democratic party 
from retaining or regaining its national position, and that therefore their party is to 
take its place as the great national party of the Union. 

To dispel such illusions, it needs only to consider Mr. Bell's speeches and votes ; 
and a single reference will suffice. 

When the bill to organize the Territory of New Mexico was pending before the 
Senate, Mr. Jefferson Davis, of Mississippi, moved the following amendment. 

"And that all laws, usages or customs, pre-existing in the Territories acquired by the United 
States from Mexico, and which in said Territories restrict, abridge or obstruct the full enjojrnent 
of any right of person or property of a citizen of the United States, as recognized or guarantied by 
the Constitution or laws of the United States, are hereby declared, and shall be held as repealed." 

The ettect and object of this amendment will appear from what Mr. Bell said re- 
garding it, as follows : 

" In the opinion of by far the greater number of the most eminent jurists of the United States, 
the laws of Mexico prohibiting slavery at the time of the cession are still in force, and must remain 
so until they are expressly repealed, either by Congress or the local Legislature. * * * Thus 
sir, slaver}', if it goes into New Mexico at all, must torce its way there in despite of local laws and 
of the interdict imposed by the bill on the Territorial Legislature. Still it is contended that the 
South is secured in the full benefit of the doctrine held by some of the most distinguished cham- 
pions of its rights, who maintain that the Constitution, pruprio vigore, that the flag of the Union 
protects the citizen in the enjoyjnent of his rights of property of every description recognized as such 
in any of the Utates, on every sea, and in every Territory of the Union. And this doctrine, it is 
said, is well founded, and if it shall be so declared by the Supreme Court, will authorize the intro- 
duction of slavery into New Mexico. The soundness of the general doctrine held upon this point, I 
think cannot ivell be questioned ur disproved; and if the question related to a Territory situated as 
Oregon u<as, tvhen the United States ca^ne into possession "fit, property in slaves ivould be entitled 
to the protection of the laws and Constitution of the United States; but the question is more 
doubtful and formidable to the interests of the South, when it is raised in reference to New Mexi- 
co, where there has been an organized society and government for two centuries, and where slavery 
was prohibited by the local sovereignty before and at the ce.ssion to the United States, and where, 
under that prohibition, slaver}' had ceased to exist The Constitution, in its application to this 
Territory, is expected, not merely to protect property in slaves, as in tiie case of Oregon, before 
there was any exercise of sovereignty one way or the other, but to supersede the local laws in 
force prohibiting slavery, when the United States came into posse.ssion of it. If the obstructions 
interposed by these laws were removed, then the principles of the Coustitution would be lelt to 
tlieir full and fair operation, and the South t/iight look-, with soj/ie confidence to the protection of 
slave property in this Territory, through the Courts of the United States.'^ 

And so, as the Executive Committee of his party proceeded to say, — in order to 
remove these 'obstructions,' — in order that the principles of the Constitution might 
he left to ' their full and fair operation,' — and in order that ' the South might look 
with some confidence to tlie protection of slave property in this Territory,' equally 
as in the others, Mr. Bell voted for the amendment of Mr. Davis 

If Mr. Bell had continued to be in the Senate at the time, it cannot be doubted 
that he would have voted for the celebrated resolutions introduced by Mr. Davis of 
Mississippi, which deny the pretended sovereignty of territorial Legislatures, and 
assert the power and the duty of thy Federal Government to protect private property 
against any usurpation of power on the part of Territories. 

In confirmation oF this it is to be remembered that Mr. Ciittenden, who was the 
first choice of the party for the Presidency, and who is at present its highest and 
ablest champion, voted for those resolutions, — nay, zealously maintained the truth 
of tlie protection doctrine by speech in the Senate. 

Thus we see tliat, if there were any possibility of Mr. Bell being President of the 
United States, or of any [lermanent national policy or purty being founded on the 
candidature of Bell, the members of that parly at the North would have to take the 



11 

protection doctrine into its creed and its action, and to face side by side with North- 
ern Democrats, the supposed unpopularity of that doctrine at the North 

Let me pause here on Mr. Bell, and diverge a moment to speak of the disinge- 
nuous and paltry devise, by means of which leading partizans of Mr. Douglas, and 
Mr. Douglas himself, have labored to disparage the cause of Breckinridge demo- 
crats. Certain it is that all true Democrats, South or North, are State Eights men 
not prepared to submit tamely to the violation of the Constitution, and the conver- 
sion of this our Federal Government into a consolidated central one, and the 
perversion of its functions so as to make ot them an instrument of assault on any of 
the individual States. Who shall presume to censure Southern Democrats for this ? 
Shall Mr. A. H. Stevens, or Mr. Soule, or Mr. Foote, or Mr. Herschel V. Johnson ? 
They cannot do it without self stultification. Mr. Bell at any rate, and his friends, 
shall not For how stands Mr Bell on this point ? I quote now from a printed 
speech of his, though it is not in the " Kecord,' : 

"If, " he says, '' if we of the South have made up our minds to yield nothing, to endure noth- 
ine:, or if a better spirit actuates us, aud we are prepared both to yield sometliing and endure 
something — and yet cannot bring our Nothern brethren to any terms of just and equitable 
arrangement and they will continue to vex and harras us now and forever, let us resolve, and let 
them suffer us, to manage our own affairs our own way.' ' 

Again, he says : 

" I say at once, give me separation, give me disunion, give me anything in preference to a 
Union sustained only by power, by constitutional and legal ties, without confidence. If our future 
career is to be one of eternal discord, and of angry crimination and recrimination, give me rather 
separation with all its consequences." 

Remember that all these avowals of disunion thoughts and purposes, contingent on 
the perseverance of the North to "vex and harass " the South by " crimination and 
recrimination," by refusal of terms of just and equitable arrangement — all these 
exhortations to separation as in preference to " a Union sustained only by power, by 
Constitutional and legal ties without confidence," — were uttered by Mr. Bell, not irre- 
sponsibly in popular speeches or hasty private letters, but deliberately and officially 
in his place as a Senator. 

I do not refer to these declarations of Mr. Bell in the sense of blame ; on the 
contrary, I commend them ; but I say that, in the presence of such declarations on 
the part of Mr. Bell, it is but party cant with some, and party misrepresentation 
with others, to talk of the relative unionism of Mr. Bell and disunionism of Mr. Breck- 
inridge. 

To return to my line of argument, — I assert that it is too late now, in view of the 
final resolution of the Douglas Convention — it is too laie for any Northern Demo- 
cray to say that, as followers of Mr Douglas in preference Mr. Breckinridge, 
they are to constitute a party in the Union, or even at the North, exempt from 
bearing their share of the burden of nationality of opinion. Their own Convention 
at theBaltimore Theatre determine 1 that, i^or after having refused to pass any 
resolution on the point at Charleston, and so produced the temporary rupture of the 
National Convention, and after persisting in the same line of policy until the con- 
summation of a permanent rupture at Baltimore, the friends of Mr. Douglas then 
passed a resolution, which many of them here at the North find it convenient to 
forget, as follows : 

" Resolved, That it is in accordance with the true interpretation of the Cincinnati Platform 
that, during the existence of the Territorial Govc-rnment, the measure of restriction, whatever 
it may be, imposed by the Federal Constitution on the power of the Territorial Legislature over 
the subject of domestic relations, as the same has been or shall be hereafter determined by the 
Supreme Court of the United States, should be respected by all good citizens, and enforced with 
promptness and fidelity by every branch of the Government " 

So, even this Convention did come to the determination to pass a resolution in- 
terpreting the Cincinnati Platform, at last ; it did discover 'restriction' on the 
powers of territorial Legislatures, but without venturing to explore the subject 
sufficiently to ascertain the exact ' measure' of the ' restriction;' it had heard that 
there ' has been' some pertinent decision of the Supreme Court, but could not stop 
to read and see what had been decided ; and it declared that whatever ' has been or 
shall be' so decided as to such ' measure of restriction,' ought to be, not only sup- 
ported by all good citizens, but ' enforced by every branch of the Government.' 

Now, then, it is this measure of restriction on the power of territorial Legisla- 
tures, as it 'has been or shall be' determined by the Sup eme Court, and this alone 
which Mr. Breckinridge and Mr. Lane, and all, of that wing of the democratic party 
which supports them, desire to have enforced by the protective power of ' every 
branch of the Government ;' that is what the Senate resolutions of Mr. Jefferson 
Davis contemplate; that is what Mr. Bell and Mr. Crittenden have asserted by 
their sneeches and votes ; and that is what the Convention at the Institute pro- 
nounced in a little plainer language, when it said : 



12 

1. Resolved, That the government of a Territory, organized by an act of Congress.is provisional 
and temporary, and during its existence all citizens of the United States have an equal right to 
settle with their property in the Territory without their right of person or property being destroy- 
ed or impaired by Congressional or territorial legislation. 

"2. Resolved. That it is the duty of the Federal Government in all its departments to protect, 
when necessary, the rights of persons and property in the Territories, and wiierever else its con- 
stitutional authority extends." 

Tliat is to say, the members of the Convention at the Institute liad also heard 
rumors that there might have been a decision of the Supreme Court defining the 
' measure of restriction' on tlie power of territorial Legislatures, and, imlike the 
Convention at the Theatre, they proceeded to inquire ; they found that there 
' has been' such a decision, read it carefully, and took it for their premises, as be- 
came ' good citizens.' Thus the premises of the two Conventions are in sub- 
stance tlie same, save that the Convention at the Institute had the courage to look 
the facts directly in the face, and aiaiaounce them in mobt explicit terms, and the 
Convention at the Theatre had not. And such is the only difference also in their 
conclusions. If any territorial Legislature shall exceed the measure of its con- 
stitutional powsr, says the Convention at the Theatre, then every branch of the 
Government is to enforce the restriction on that power. ' Every branch of tlie Gov- 
ernment' — Congress, the Executive, the Judiciary — is to enforce restrictions on 
the power of the territorial Legislature. What is that but ' to protect' when nec- 
essary the right of persons and property in the Territories against any unconstitu- 
tional action of territorial Legislatures ? One is the inexplicit statement of the 
same doctrine, the other the explicit : there is no other material difierence between 
the two propositions. 

Gentlemen, you see clearly now what the position is which we severally occupy 
in the matter of principles. 

Mr. Lincoln asserts the constitutional right and the duty of the Federal Govern- 
ment to intervene to prevent the citizens of the Southern States from settling with 
their slave property in the Territories. Mr. Breckinridge denies this. Mr. 
Douglas also denies it. And Mr. Bell denies it. 

Mr. Breckinridge asserts the right of the Southern States so to settle in the Territor- 
ies, ftlr. Bell asserts it. Mr. Douglas admits it. Mr. Breckinridge and Mr. Bell main- 
tain further that, as the Federal Government is not to intervene against citizens of the 
Southern States directly, so also it shall not intervene indirectly through its creature, 
the territorial Legislature ; and that, if this its creature undertakes thus by usurpation 
to intervene, the Federal Government shall stay the hand of its own creature — in other 
words, that the non-intervention of the Federal Government shall be complete in sub- 
stance and fact as well as in pretence and name. Here Mr. Douglas separates from them 
and attributes to the Legislature adverse powers not found in and derived from the Con- 
stitution, and powers denied to it by the Supreme Court. 

On the premises of Mr. Douglas, the doctrine of non-intervention is a delusion, a snare 
and a sham. It keeps the word of promise to the ear only, and breaks it to the hope. 

Accordingly his ov.'n political friends, his own Convention, had to quit him here; for 
the two Conventions, representing the dissident divisions of the democratic party, pass- 
ed declaratory protective resolutions, the same in effect, though diffei-cnt in language 
The Institute Convention said explicitlj- — it is the duty of the Federal Government, ' in 
all its departments,' to protect the rights of persons and property against encroachment 
and usurpation on the part of territorial Legislatures ; the Theatre Convention said, less 
explicitly, that it is the dutj' of the Federal Government, in all its branches, to enforce 
the constitutional restrictions on the power of the territorial Legislature. 

I saj', gentlemen, thus we stand. Let not those Democrats, who plainlv and explicitly 
declare their assent to a constitutional truth, fear to loose by their explicitness; let not 
those who implicitly, or less explicitly declare their assent to the same truth, hope to gain 
by their inexplicitness. It is constitutional truth. North and South alike ; and the dem- 
ocratic party. North and South alike, and any and every national and constitutional 
party, will have to stand or fall, according as it does or does not adhere to this cardinal 
political truth of the coequal constitutional right of each and all of the States in the 
Union. Democrats, true friends of the Constitution and the Union, who imagine that 
the democratic party at the North, or any democratic party at tlie North, can sustain itself 
against the Republicans by standing timidly, shrinkingly, and tender-footedly, on the 
platform of adjudicated constitutional truths, deceive themselves egregiously; we can 
save the party, we can redeem it, in one way, and one only, and that is, in franklj', man- 
fully, firmly, and fearlessly, planting ourselves on the great fundamental truths of the 
Constitution. Thus have we succeeded hitherto, and if we cannot succeed in the same 
way hereafter, then it will be evident that the Constitution has lost its authority with 
the American people, and that the American Union is a beautiful but lifeless corpse, a 
phantasm of greatness, a mere simulacrum of power, and is about to enter, as a memory 
and a history only, into the lugubrious procession of the departed empires of the Old 
World. 



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